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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Todd argued that his rights under both the Due
Process Clause and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment were
violated when the district court punished him based on his indigent status, or,
alternatively, that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence upon him based on his purported indigency and in light of the mitigating
factors present in his case.

In response, the State contends that the district court

properly considered Mr. Todd's purported inability to pay restitution as a sentencing
factor under I.C. § 19-2521 1 and because Mr. Todd has not challenged the
constitutionality of I.C. § 19-2521, he has failed to show error in the district court's
decision to impose a prison sentence based on its belief that Mr. Todd would be unable
repay all of the stipulated restitution. The State not only misreads I.C. § 19-2521, but
fails to grasp the nature of the claim raised by Mr. Todd based on United States
Supreme Court precedent or acknowledge that the prosecutor specifically argued that
the district court should "take" Mr. Todd's time because he believed that Mr. Todd would
be unable to repay the victim. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983); Tate v.
Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); and Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970).

1

In its briefing, the State cites to both I.C. § 18-2526 and I.C. § 19-2526 for the same
proposition. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.5-8.) Unfortunately, neither statute exists.
However, given the quoted language referenced by the State, Appellant assumes the
State intended to cite to I.C. § 19-2521.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously
articulated in Mr. Todd's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

2

ISSUE
Were Mr. Todd's rights under both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment violated when the district court based its decision
to impose a long prison sentence upon Mr. Todd in part on his inability to pay the
restitution actually imposed?

3

ARGUMENT
Mr. Todd's Rights Under Both The Due Process Clause And The Equal Protection
Clause Of The Fourteenth Amendment Were Violated When The District Court Based
Its Decision To Impose A Lengthy Prison Sentence Upon Mr. Todd Almost Entirely On
Mr. Todd's Indigent Status
A.

Introduction
The instant reply brief is necessary to address the State's claim that the district

court properly considered Mr. Todd's purported inability to pay restitution as a
sentencing factor under I.C. §19-2521. However, as is set forth below, Mr. Todd's rights
under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
were violated when the district court viewed Mr. Todd's purported indigency as an
aggravating factor warranting a prison sentence rather than probation, where Mr. Todd
could attempt repay the victim for his criminal conduct and support his family.

B.

Mr. Todd's Rights Under Both The Due Process Clause And The Equal
Protection Clause Of The Fourteenth Amendment Were Violated When The
District Court Based Its Decision To Impose A Lengthy Prison Sentence Upon
Mr. Todd Almost Entirely On Mr. Todd's Indigent Status
1.

It Is Improper For A Sentencing Court To Impose A Harsher Sentence
Upon A Defendant Based Upon That Defendant's Indigent Status

In its briefing, the State argues that "Todd has not cited a single case prohibiting
a sentencing court from considering a defendant's ability to pay restitution when that
court imposes sentence." (Respondent's Brief, p.5.) First of all, it is necessary to clarify
the issue presented on appeal. Idaho Code §19-2521 clearly allows a court to consider
a defendant's willingness to compensate a victim as a mitigating factor warranting a
defendant to be placed on probation. However, Mr. Todd is arguing that the district

4

court erred in punishing Mr. Todd, by imposing a prison sentence rather than placing
him on probation, because both the court and the prosecutor believed Mr. Todd would
be unable to repay the stipulated restitution, despite the fact that Mr. Todd had a job
lined up in the event he was placed on probation. The crux of all of the cases cited in
the Appellant's brief is that a court cannot affirmatively treat a defendant differently,
based on the amount of money he or she has. Beardon v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665
(1983) (recognizing that "if the State determines a fine or restitution to be the
appropriate penalty for the crime, it may not thereafter imprison a person solely because
he lacked the resources to pay it."); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (holding that the
state cannot convert a fine into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and
cannot immediately pay the fine in full); Williams

v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (A

defendant may not be subjected to imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum merely
because they are too poor to pay a fine); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-358
(1963) (holding that indigent defendants are entitled to counsel on first direct appeal);

Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 42-43 (1967) (holding that an indigent defendant is
entitled to a free transcript of the preliminary hearing for use during the trial); Mayer v.

Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 198-199 (1971) (holding that an indigent defendant cannot be
denied an adequate record to appeal a conviction, even under a fine-only statute); and

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 (1956) (plurality opinion) (striking down a state
practice of granting appellate review only to those persons who could afford the
transcript).
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2.

Idaho Code §19-2521 Permits A District Court To Consider A Defendant's
Payment Of Restitution Or Willingness To Pay Restitution As A Mitigating
Factor In Deciding Whether The Defendant Should Be Placed On
Probation And Does Not Permit The District Court To Consider A
Defendant's Purported Inability To Pay Restitution As An Aggravating
Factor Warranting The Imposition Of A Prison Sentence

In its briefing, the State argues that it was permissible, under I.C. § 19-2521(2)(f),
for the sentencing court to consider Mr. Todd's ability to pay restitution when imposing
sentence.

The State misconstrues Appellant's argument on appeal and misreads

I.C. § 19-2521. Mr. Todd has argued that it was improper for the district court to punish
him based on its belief that he would be unable to pay restitution. At sentencing, the
State advocated that because it believed Mr. Todd would not be able to repay the
restitution in full, the court should "tak[e] his time."2 (Tr., p.52, Ls.4-12.) Specifically, the
prosecutor argued:
Also, with regard to restitution, I know Mr. Todd is not going to pay all this
money back. There's $60,000 here that is owed. He doesn't have a dime
to his name right now and that money is not going to be seen by
Mr. Lewis. I think that is the reason, you know, if he can't pay this money
back, he has to pay it back another way, and I think taking his time is the
only thing that the Courl has in order to impose punishment because the
money he stole, who knows whatever happened to that.
(Tr., p.52, Ls.4-12 (emphasis added).) The district court then obliged the prosecutor's
request, weighing heavily Mr. Todd's purported inability to pay restitution, in choosing to
impose a prison sentence, rather than place Mr. Todd on probation as was
recommended by the Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) investigator,
so that Mr. Todd could begin repaying restitution, the restitution that he stipulated to.
(Tr., p.58, L.17 - p.61, L.6; PSI, pp.9-10.) Mr. Todd is not arguing that the district court

2

Curiously, the State makes no reference to, or attempts to defend the unconstitutional
and unethical position taken by the prosecutor during the sentencing hearing.
6

could not have considered whether Mr. Todd had already repaid restitution or his
willingness to repay restitution as a mitigating factor warranting a suspended sentence.
Rather, Mr. Todd's argument is that the court erred when it punished Mr. Todd based on
its belief that Mr. Todd would be unable to pay restitution, which is impermissible and a
violation of Mr. Todd's Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The State's reliance on I.C. §19-2521 is also misplaced. In the Respondent's
Brief, the State argues that the district court's consideration of Mr. Todd's ability to pay
restitution was permissible under I.C. §19-2521, and Mr. Todd's claim fails because he
has failed to challenge the constitutionality of the referenced statute. (Respondent's
Brief, pp.5-7.)

However, whether Mr. Todd has challenged the constitutionality of

I.C. § 19-2521 is irrelevant to determine whether the district court violated Mr. Todd's
Fourteenth Amendment rights by punishing him because of its belief he was too poor to
repay the stipulated restitution.

The fact that the statute exists does not cure any

unconstitutionality during Mr. Todd's sentencing hearing.

Additionally, I.C. § 19-

2521(2)(f) considers it a mitigating factor that a defendant has already or is willing to
repay restitution, not an aggravating factor that a defendant is indigent and too poor to
repay restitution.
Idaho Code §19-2521(2)(f) provides:
(2) The following grounds, while not controlling the discretion of the court,
shall be accorded weight in favor of avoiding a sentence of imprisonment.
(f) The defendant has compensated or will compensate the victim
of his criminal conduct for the damage or the injury that was
sustained, however, nothing in this section shall prevent the
appropriate use of imprisonment and restitution in combination.
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Idaho Code § 192521(2)(f) (emphasis added). Thus, I.C. §19-2521 requires that the
court consider the payment or willingness to make payment as mitigating factors "in
favor" of not imposing a prison sentence. Here, Mr. Todd stipulated to the restitution
amount and voiced his desire to repay the victim for the losses incurred as a result of
his criminal conduct, informing the court that upon being placed on probation he already
had a job lined up. (Tr., p.41, Ls.14-21.) However, rather than considering this as a
mitigating factor, which LC. §19-2521 requires, both the prosecutor and the district court
apparently believed that Mr. Todd was too poor and would not be able to repay
restitution, and the district court responded by treating Mr. Todd's indigent status as an
aggravating factor, warranting a long prison sentence. 3
Accordingly, as is articulated herein and in Mr. Todd's Appellant's Brief, Mr. Todd
asserts that his rights under both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were violated when the district court imposed a
lengthy prison sentence almost entirely based upon his indigent status.

3

For some reason, the State seems to believe it is important that the district court did
not even impose the maximum sentence upon Mr. Todd. (Respondent's Brief, p.7.)
However, the question is not whether harsher punishment was available to the district
court, it is a question of whether more severe punishment was imposed based on
Mr. Todd's indigent status.
8

CONCLUSION
Mr. Todd respectfully requests that this Court vacate his sentence and remand
his case for a new sentencing hearing in front of a different district court judge.
Alternatively, he requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 21 st day of January, 2009.

ERIC D.FDERICKSEN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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